How had Michelin caught up so fast?

The 2002 season had been completely dominated by Ferrari and Bridgestone. For 2003, Ferrari declared they would continue their policy of going full on and trying to win every race, and considering their tremendous success the previous year this confidence did not seem misplaced. But in fact 2003 was to prove a terrific struggle for us, a complete reversal of the last season.

There were a number of reasons. First was Ferrari's policy of aiming to win every race. The successful effort to achieve total victory in 2002 had delayed Ferrari's preparations for the coming season, and, as Hamashima so often remarked, "When Ferrari's development is late, that delays us too."

Another factor was the vast improvement in Michelin's performance. In 2002, McLaren's last minute switch to Michelin meant they did not have enough time to really match their car with the new tyres. Now, in their second year with Michelin, McLaren were quite clearly back on their old form. By the end of the 13th round in Hungary, Michael Schumacher was ranked first with 72 points. But the two drivers right behind him were both using Michelins - Juan Pablo Montoya for Williams with 71 points and Kimi Raikkonen for McLaren with 70 points.

How was Michelin able to press us so hard? Hamashima: "The major reason was that we hadn't done the research - we didn't fully grasp the characteristics of the tyres they were using." For example, that year Michelin's tyres had extremely good traction at the start. According to Hamashima, we lost because we didn't analyse the reasons for this.

We had become too absorbed in our own development and weren't paying enough attention to what our rival was doing - and it would cost us dearly.

Humiliation in Hungary

As the close-fought season continued, we began to see a trend in the races we were losing. Nurburgring, Magny-Cours, Hockenheimring and Hungaroring - these were all races held between June and August, on circuits with surfaces that have comparatively low mu (friction coefficient), meaning they heated up easily.

Our worst experience came at the Hungarian Grand Prix, where Michelin-shod cars took all seven top places and even our best driver, Michael Schumacher, suffered the indignity of being lapped by Alonso.

Suganuma remembers it well, and his tone of voice is still bitter as he describes his feelings at the time: "I was so mortified, I couldn't sleep. We hadn't matched our tyres accurately."

"Coming out of this disaster, that's why we were so elated when we started winning again the next year. I remember when Schumacher was close to lapping Alonso, hearing him saying on the radio 'let's play this cool.' I was really impressed by his attitude, because in my mind I was wanting to shout "go on, go on, lap him!"

A new construction puts us back in the game

After the disastrous summer, we now entered the end game of the 2003 season. The last race in Europe would be at Monza, Ferrari's home ground. Then came the United States Grand Prix, and finally the climax of the season at Suzuka, on Bridgestone's home turf. It was a matter of pride - we really had to break the long chain of defeats.

Both Bridgestone and Ferrari were now making a huge effort to reverse our failing fortunes. For the tests held after the bitter failure of the Hungarian GP, we brought 2,000 tyres (500 sets). Ferrari responded with equal enthusiasm, trying all kinds of methods to squeeze extra speed out of their car, including changing the weight distribution to improve balance.

Testing 2,000 tyres, we were resigned to finding many we wouldn't be able to use. But finally one tyre emerged that set us back on the path to winning again. We discovered it as we experimented with an entirely new concept - using a successful concept from the end of the previous year with a revised version of a structural design brought over from All-Japan F3000 racing.

Using this new concept tyre, Ferrari rode to victory in the Italian GP. We had found a winning formula - one that won again in America and Japan, and would later carry Michael Schumacher all the way to his fifth consecutive Drivers' Championship title.

BAR-Honda shock at Suzuka

All eyes now focused on the final round, the Japanese Grand Prix. Michael Schumacher was ranked top with 92 points, but McLaren's Kimi Raikkonen was still a serious contender with 83. Although Schumacher was way ahead of the field, the championship was still in play even in this final race. And as if that wasn't enough to stir the passions of the Japanese fans who flocked to Suzuka, they had a bonus attraction in the last-minute drafting of Takuma Sato for this race.

Sato had made his F1 debut with Jordan in 2002, but the loss of a regular seat this year caused him to switch to BAR, becoming their third driver. When Jacques Villeneuve was taken off the team just before the Japanese GP, BAR decided to enter Sato in his place. It was an excellent choice - from 13th place on the grid, Sato kept on overtaking right until the end to gain a sixth place finish.

Hamashima remembers how the Japanese crowd went wild: "They were going crazy in the stands. I was feeling pretty good myself. But then, back in the paddock, something happened that dashed cold water on my excitement."

BAR-Honda were going to switch to Michelin! Hamashima heard the news from one of the Michelin staff. He rushed over to check with the BAR-Honda team and was told, "Yes, we've decided."

"I was stunned. Just at the moment our tests were going so well and producing results. It was a very bitter experience."

Formula One is a fight on many levels - what you see on the track is just one. Much also depends on manoeuvres behind the scenes.